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Tibet’s wildlife problem
[TIN] Tibet Update 30 December 2006
The year 2006 has seen numerous reports on the subject of wildlife in Tibet.
Although Tibetan consumption of illegally traded pelts of endangered animals
seems to have been tackled for now by a popular movement inspired by the Dalai
Lama, there are no signs that the illicit trade in wildlife will end as fast.
Tibet’s wildlife problem is framed within a wider PRC wildlife problem,
entangled in Chinese domestic and international policies. Tibetan regions within
the PRC increasingly function as a sales market, a transit zone and a resource
area for wildlife products, none of which contribute significantly to local
wealth. Whereas the former seems stimulated mainly by tourism, the latter is
linked to mainland China’s large demand for wildlife products and its fast
developing infrastructure which facilitates the trade. Attempts by the emerging
civil society in Tibet and mainland China to tackle the problem have had some
effects, but their influence and leeway remain limited by governance issues and
economic pressure.
The rise and fall in the demand for Tibetan wildlife pelts
The use of wildlife pelts is nothing new to Tibetan culture, but it’s only
recently that it has extended beyond traditional contexts in connection with
Tibet’s situation in the late twentieth century. Far from being concealed and
undocumented, information on the proliferation of wildlife pelts in Tibetan
regions of the PRC could be found for many years in Chinese official and
non-official publications, as well as in Western media as an assumed expression
of regained Tibetanness. The wearing of pelts was presented in China as
illustrating their successful policies in terms of wealth development and
respect of Tibetan culture for propaganda purposes; however, the Western media’s
reading was that of a cultural revival despite decades of domination by China.
Both views were right in their own ways, as indeed the demonstrative wearing of
pelts had become for many Tibetans a welcome opportunity to celebrate their
Tibetanness without fear of state disapproval. It emerged during the relative
liberalisation of the 1980s, when Tibetans, still hesitant about displaying
signs of cultural distinctiveness, selected a few stereotypical ‘Tibetan
characteristics’ which fitted the Chinese mainstream imagination of Tibetans. In
particular, Tibet’s show business from the 1990s contributed to the propagation
of such stereotypes. It presented caricatures and pseudo-‘traditional’
vestimentary habits, which, contrary to the more authentic aspects of Tibetan
culture, were not only acceptable to the state but even encouraged and sponsored
by the authorities as a visible denial to the exile presentation of Tibet as
poor and culturally denigrated.
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Awareness about the imminent dangers of the extinction of big cats, however, led
recently formed Tibetan environmental NGOs like the SnowLand Great River
Environmental Protection Association or the Wild Yak Organisation, partly with
some support of Chinese and Western environmentalists, to try and reverse the
trend. They created mobile units running environmental education and cultural
preservation programmes; they also ran classes in schools and distributed
booklets and leaflets to local Tibetans, in order for them "to know about
Tibetan traditional costumes before liberation". With the help of villagers they
conducted surveys in order "to understand the current situation of wildlife and
traditional costumes" and to assess the population’s "opinions about changes of
Tibetan traditional costumes. Reports from these NGOs dating from late 2003
mention some confiscations of consignments of Tiger and Leopard skins as well as
ivory, mostly of Indian origin, by the authorities. Their general recommendation
to eradicate the illicit trade was to "promote law and policy", "enhance the
government work on wildlife", and "inspire ecological culture" by involving the
Buddhist clergy in campaigns to "change attitudes" and "call for ecologically
acceptable costumes". Though sources do acknowledge that these efforts brought
some results at local level, as a whole, they were in no position to resolve the
problem, particularly since the sustainability of local changes in attitudes
appeared questionable.
A radical change occurred when other NGOs working outside Tibet involved the
Dalai Lama in the fight against wearing fur. The Dalai Lama had already been an
active supporter of environmental initiatives like the Buddhist Perception of
Nature programme initiated from Hong Kong by Nancy Nash in the late 1980s, and
he was invited by the Wildlife Trust of India (WTI), New Delhi, and Care for the
Wild, UK, in Spring 2005 to participate in their campaign. The rising level of
environmental and wildlife awareness in exile Tibetan circles led for instance
to the creation of the NGO Tesi Environmental Awareness Movement (TEAM) in June
2005, and to the publication in summer 2005 in the Dharamsala-based Tibetan
Bulletin of an article which highlighted the involvement of Tibetans in the
trade. At the summit of the campaign in January 2006, the Dalai Lama spoke at
length and in unusually strong words against the fur frenzy, stating that seeing
Tibetans wearing furs made him wish "not to live anymore". Spontaneous
fur-burning campaigns started within a few days all across Tibet until late
Spring 2006. Apart from being one of the most powerful demonstrations of loyalty
to the Dalai Lama within Tibet in decades, the movement eradicated the wearing
of furs among Tibetans, at least for the time being, and fur trade prices have
plummeted. In response, shops in Lhasa which used to openly display Tiger pelts
switched to crude fakes made with dyed sheep skins, but this did not meet with
much success. By summer 2006, a time for festivals and hence an important
occasion for wearing fur, the movement had made fur garments so ‘politically
incorrect’ that it had virtually disappeared.
Though conforming to China’s laws, the movement did raise objections among the
Chinese authorities due to its close association with the Dalai Lama, and local
official bodies and Tibetans close to the authorities defiantly promoted the
wearing of wildlife fur. Nonetheless, a source which observed the Lithang
festival for TibetInfoNet in summer 2006 confirmed that almost no Tibetan could
be seen wearing furs. The authorities who organised the festival, though, did
stage a ‘Tibetan fashion show’ in which fur costumes featured prominently. Also,
in an apparent attempt to discredit the current Dalai Lama’s position on
wildlife furs, a tent made entirely of tiger skins which used to belong to the
sixth Dalai Lama (1683-1705) was exhibited for all to see on the festival
ground. The Mongolian-style tent, a present from a Mongolian prince, is kept in
Lithang and has been occasionally displayed at the festival. Most Tibetan areas
have witnessed similar attempts by the authorities to encourage the wearing of
fur. Two NGOs, the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) and the Wildlife
Protection Society of India (WPSI), who circulated pictorial material about the
wearing of wildlife furs in Tibet in a report published in September 2005,
followed up with a second report in September 2006. Although it slightly
downplayed the movement’s success, this new report essentially confirms the
trend away from fur. In fact, apart from a few images showing fur wearers close
to the authorities, most of its illustrations were reprinted from the Summer
2005 report.
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Despite the sharp Tibetan decline in the use of skins since early 2006, there is
no indication whatsoever that the illicit trade with pelts across the border has
diminished. This raises questions about the effective share of past Tibetan
consumption within the trade. The new EIA/WPSI report deplores the continuation
of the trade and assumes that, now the sale of skins to tourists has increased,
it quotes one trader as stating that 80% of his customers were mainland Chinese,
while others said local government officials and army officers are among the
Chinese customers. Though the report insists that "until early 2006, the primary
market for tiger and leopard skins was for decorating chupas", it comes short of
providing any relevant figures, making such assertions speculative. Research
conducted by TibetInfoNet and information provided by wildlife experts working
in Tibet indicate that Tibetan wildlife consumption represented only one
limited, though unquestionably spectacular, aspect of a much broader wildlife
issue related to Tibet.
Tibet as a sales market and transit zone for wildlife products
Tibetan regions of the PRC have indeed become an important sales market for
wildlife products, but this is a market located in Tibet rather than a Tibetan
market, and the continuing growth of this market appears to be linked to the
exponential growth of tourism in Tibet. Beyond that, Tibet remains a prominent
transit zone for the illicit wildlife trade. The recent opening of the railway
linking the Chinese mainland with Lhasa exacerbates both problems, in that it
considerably lowers the costs and simplifies the logistics, thus facilitating
access to and transport through Tibet. While sources clearly state that there
are some affluent western tourists among the buyers of illicit wildlife products
in Tibet, as a whole the goods available on Tibet’s markets reflect a Chinese
demand, which is unsurprising, since Chinese tourists have for long outnumbered
Western tourists in the region. This is reflected in a remark in the EIA/WPSI
report that paws and claws are left attached to big cat skins on sale. Whereas
this practice does not make sense in the Tibetan context where paws and claws
are seen as valueless, it does so for Chinese customers by proving the
authenticity of the skins. A sense of snobbery rather than taste is what is
generating the market for big cat skins among the nouveau riche, many of which
hail from south China, mainly Shenzen and Hong Kong. For this circle of
customers it is crucial that skins be easily identified as authentic by third
persons. A report in the Londoner Telegraph of 22 October 2006 quoted a Chinese
wildlife courier on the Beijing-Lhasa railway as saying: "I sell mainly to rich
Chinese. My last customer was a Taiwanese businessman (…) the train is easy to
use, safe and cheap. Many people are using it to sell stuff all over China".
Another case in point is the trade in ivory. Though Tibetan NGOs mentioned the
existence of a local market for ivory in internal reports a few years ago, the
quantities involved then were relatively negligible, since ivory features in
Tibetan costumes only in very small quantities, for instance for buttons. The
ivory items available now for instance on Lhasa’s market, besides involving
considerable quantities, reveal that the public targeted is Chinese, since many
items like statues and carvings match the general taste of Chinese tourists in
Tibet and elsewhere. In one of their briefing papers, EIA state that their
investigators were told that the ivory is mostly imported from India and
Thailand, though African ivory is also available, and that some of it enters
China already processed, while some reportedly arrives raw and is carved
locally. TibetInfoNet’s research confirms that ivory of African origin partly
directly, partly after transiting through the Middle East, enters the PRC via
Pakistan and the Central Asian republics in Xinjiang (East Turkestan). While a
large number of items are brought to mainland China, some goes to Tibetan
regions where it is sold to tourists. Unconfirmed reports also indicate that
ivory and wildlife products from Central Asia which enter China in Xinjiang
might be diverted via Aksai Chin before transiting across the north Tibetan
Changthang plateau and Qinghai/Amdo on their way to mainland China, in order to
avoid the main roads. Similar to the traffic in skins, the networks which trade,
distribute and retail ivory items are almost exclusively in the hands of Chinese
Muslims/Hui people (although, in the case of skins, Tibetan syndicates mainly
control the smuggling from South Asia across the Himalaya; they also run part of
the wholesale distribution in Tibet (see Following the tiger’s trail 31 January
2006)). The Hui, who have their main markets on the periphery of Tibet, also
sell pelt and ivory, both legal and illegal items, in many other parts of China.
Although there is a century-long tradition of ivory carving in China, there is
none in Tibet. For this reason, hence, Tibetans are unlikely to be involved if
the ivory is being carved locally. Therefore, though Tibet is the market,
Tibetans at large hardly benefit, either as artisans or as traders.
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Apart from the great number of tourists and their general demand for the
material, there is no specific reason to sell ivory items in Tibet. The sale of
ivory here appears therefore mainly demand driven. In the case of wildlife skins
however, supply and demand are confluent. As far as demand is concerned, the
concept of Tibetans clad in wildlife skins has a firm place in the Chinese
imagination of an exotic Tibet, qualifying Tibet as a most appropriate location
for the trade. As far as supply is concerned, South Asia is geographically close
and its borders, despite drastic efforts to curb illegal immigration, remain
porous for mafia networks with symbiotic relationships with the authorities (see
Following the tiger’s trail 31 January 2006). These factors present optimum
conditions for the trade. Considering the sizeable profits and negligible
chances of getting caught, even the death penalty which Chinese law foresees for
wildlife traders appears hardly dissuasive. Meanwhile, although environmental
NGOs inside Tibet are burgeoning in always greater numbers, they remain mostly
toothless in a context where prominent agents of the trade are often effectively
tolerated by representatives of the state authorities. Also, though the
tremendous success of the anti-fur campaigns following the Dalai Lama’s advice
has radically reduced fur consumption, ironically, by raising the defiance and
the level of suspicion of the authorities in Tibet, it also put local Tibetan
NGOs under even greater pressure not to appear ‘political’.
Tibet as a wildlife resource area and the international dimensions of the trade
Besides having become a transit zone and market ground for the wildlife trade,
the Tibetan regions of the PRC are also a resource area for Chinese wildlife
consumption. Whereas wildlife has become comparatively rare in the Chinese
mainland, the Tibetan plateau remains an area of natural richness. Much more
significant than the fur market is the great number of medicines and remedies
based on wildlife ingredients which are sold in the traditional medicine shops
ubiquitous in Chinese cities. Tibetan regions provide a great number of these
ingredients like bear bile, musk etc. many of which are procured either in an
ecologically harmful slash-and-burn manner, or under conditions fully at odds
with the modern categories of nature and animal protection propagated by
relevant international organisations. Some of these medicines are acknowledged
as health-promoting. However, a great number of potions have only presumed
effects on a countless number of sicknesses and corporal deficiencies ranging
from cancer to impotency. Also, tonics for general well-being and long-life
elixirs are of doubtful efficacy and their alleged effect is merely based on
still wide-spread superstitions which more than half a century of
state-propagated ‘scientific attitude’ have failed to eradicate. The government
has always been keen to eradicate all forms of superstitions, but the popularity
of these pseudo-medicines and their image of being deeply rooted in Chinese
culture appear to have hindered the Chinese efforts to regulate the market.
Beyond that, their high demand makes them an economic factor which contributes
to the country’s growth, as recent years have seen an expanding international
market for traditional Chinese medicine. Whereas in the past laws prohibited the
uncontrolled export of Chinese medicines, today the numbers of shops selling
serious and less serious ‘traditional’ remedies has mushroomed in Western
cities, and this is welcomed by the Chinese authorities as a source of profit
and prestige. In London for instance, the retail segment for Chinese medicine
has grown from a dozen shops about fifteen years ago, then mostly concentrated
within the Chinese community, to between 1000 and 2000 shops today.
These growing Chinese domestic and foreign demands put additional pressure on
wildlife, the trade of which happens in a grey area between legality and
illegality, undermining international health, wildlife and animal protection
regulations. Interpol estimates that the illegal trade in endangered species is
worth 5 billion dollars a year, making the sector only second to drugs. China,
with its own domestic consumption, its many processing facilities and as an
import and re-exporting hub, is a major centre for the trade. Though inside the
PRC the Tibetan plateau is a major supplier of wildlife products, wildlife
workers in regions and countries surrounding China unanimously point to a
growing drain of wildlife raw products across the border to China. As the ivory
trade clearly illustrates, certain wildlife products even enter China from
oversees. Pelts of the endangered snow leopard from Kyrghiztan or Mongolia enter
China in Xinjiang before being sold in diverse parts of the PRC or abroad. South
Asian wildlife skins, tiger bones and other products enter China through Tibet,
and the recent opening of trade posts on the Tibet border like Nathula raises
concerns among specialists that this will again facilitate the trade.
In the UK, police authorities have officially expressed concern that “Asia has
become a transit hub for illegal Wildlife products”, but they acknowledge
informally that ‘Asia’ is an euphemism for China. Much of it is for the
traditional Chinese medicine market in the U.K., not primarily as a result of a
growing local Chinese population, but due to a western demand for trendy
alternatives. In November 2006, the London Metropolitan Police started
‘Operation Charm’ focusing "on Chinese medicine practitioners selling goods that
are made from, or even claim to be made from, endangered species" as "tiger
bone, rhino horn, bear bile and musk". A significant proportion of these is
likely to originate from or have transited through Tibet. Apart from medicinal
products, the campaign also focuses on illegal pelts and the prohibited wool of
the Tibetan antelope.
China has come under pressure internationally to tackle its wildlife problem,
but so far progress has been slow. This is partly due to the tendency of Chinese
representatives on international forums to often propose solutions effectively
equaling an acceptance of the status quo by the international community. The
54th meeting of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES) Standing Committee held in Geneva in summer 2006 recommended that
parameters be agreed for measuring progress in combating the trade in tiger
products until April 2007. Though, the CITES Secretariat declared itself
satisfied with China’s domestic control, it recommended that China should not
yet be given trading partner status in order to allow additional time to monitor
the implementation and the effectiveness of China’s newly established system of
trade controls. China reacted with a blend of indignation, pressure and promises
of betterment. In connection with ivory, its delegates criticised that fact that
if China is not allowed to import ivory from legal stockpiles, Japan could be in
a position to buy the entire 60 tonnes approved for sale. They argued that, if
unable to import ivory legally, the carving industry would soon revert to the
black market. On the eve of President Hu Jintao’s visit to India in November
2006, Indian and Chinese delegations negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding on
wildlife protection. Both countries agreed to share intelligence in order to
curb the illegal cross-border trade, and some Chinese staff might in future be
trained at Dehradun’s Wildlife Institute of India. However, China also brought
up a controversial project, the farm-breeding of Tigers. While both countries
agreed upon a "consensus" that China would "rigorously and explicitly label"
farm-products, wildlife specialists express strong reservations about the
project, since it could effectively provide an easy channel for laundering
illegal wild tiger products.
Meanwhile, a growing number of nature and animal protection NGOs in the Chinese
mainland are popularising the wildlife cause, but it is difficult to see how
fast and to what extent the movement can contribute to curb an intense wildlife
trade supported by traditions and lobbies. China’s leadership in any case took
notice of the movement and acknowledges or even encourages it occasionally in
the state media. Columnist Zou Hanru for instance lamented the fate of the tiger
in the 8 December 2006 issue of China Daily and praised private campaigns in
North East China to save the Siberian tiger. So far, however, the focus of the
inner-Chinese debate is on the dire situation of China’s own wildlife, while the
prominent role of the country in the international wildlife trade and in
particular the intense and mostly illegal consumption of its neighbours’
wildlife remains widely out of scope.
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